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SUMMARY: Today, natural gas is considered the biggest source of supplying the energy required by 
many residential and industrial areas. A look at the technologies available in Iran makes it evident 
that pipelines are the best and safest way for the country to carry and distribute natural gas. This 
energy resource, which is sometimes referred to as clean fuel, plays a strategic role in providing 
required energy. On the other hand, this fuel must be supplied in a continuous and yet safe manner. 
Hence, we arrive to the conclusion that appropriate measures are needed to be taken to manage the 
risks involved in leakage, firing and explosion in these facilities. To meet the goal, it is very nece-
ssary to probe into the reasons of catastrophes and examine reliability issues. Also, it is inevitable for 
us to estimate the likelihood of catastrophes in these pipelines. One of the essential steps of risk eva-
luation process is to estimate the likelihood of potential catastrophes. This paper adopts FTA met-
hodology to study the process of catastrophes likelihood estimation in natural gas pipelines. Also, 
a novel method is provided here which is based on assigning weights to fault tree and “What-if” 
scenario is used to identify the hazards involved in carrying natural gas from its main source. Based 
on the results obtained in the study, we propose to control the likelihood of catastrophes occurrence 
in natural gas pipelines using a technical and systematic approach in which the underlying causes 
of these catastrophes are identified and controlled..
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INTRODUCTION
Natural gas pipelines fall into three groups: 
collection pipelines, carrying pipelines and dis-
tribution pipelines. Collection pipelines convey 
gas from the cap of the wells to storage cen-
ters. These groups of pipelines have mostly low 
pressure with very low likelihood rate for cata-
strophes incidence. Natural gas is carried thro-
ugh carrying lines from storage centers to refi-
neries to get refined. Then, this gas is carried to 
distribution network to be supplied for residenti-
al and industrial centers (Ambituuni et al, 2015).
These carrying lines pass through different 
areas like oasis, deserts, fields, mountainous 
areas and sometimes from neighborhood of ru-
ral lands and agricultural lands. While passing 
these areas, they are mostly buried under the 
ground. In contrast to carrying lines, the pipeli-
nes of distribution network passes through highly 
populated and often urban areas, while they are 
sometimes buried underground. They exposes 
significant risk in terms of firing and explosion. 
The rate of catastrophes in distribution pipelines 
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is higher than that of other groups of pipelines, 
such that carrying and collection pipelines are 
ranked in the second and third place in terms of 
these risks, respectively (U.K. Health and Safety 
Executive, 2000).
Currently, natural gas is the mostly used fuel 
and energy source in residential and industrial 
areas. Equipped to this knowledge, it can be pro-
posed that any catastrophe in these pipelines and 
any disturbance in safe and continuous supplying 
of natural gas will bring about negative outco-
mes. These catastrophes not only risk the life of 
the companies personnel and employees as well 
as those people which are in the neighborhood 
of these pipelines and bring about damages to 
facilities, but disturb the daily lives of people 
and interrupt the functions of industrial centers. 
To get a little technical, these catastrophes cre-
ate energy crisis. In the event that catastrophe 
happens in international pipelines used for gas 
export, it not only causes direct damages, but 
discredits the supplying companies and their abi-
lity to act their responsibilities. Thus, taking risk 
control measures for gas pipelines is completely 
necessary and essential. To lower the risks the 
pipelines are exposed to, either the intensity of 
the implications of these incidences must be re-
duced, or the probability of the incidences must 
be lowered. The current study, tries to approach 
the risk control through the second strategy, i.e. 
decreasing the likelihood of these negative in-
cidences (Thomas & Dawe, 2003, Jo & Crawl, 
2008).
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) is a semi-quantita-
tive method through which the underlying cau-
ses of and incidence can be attributed to the top 
event (Dhillon, 2008). Therefore, the likelihood 
of events can be reduced through controlling the 
underlying causes. Using this method, it is po-
ssible, for instance, to estimate how the likeliho-
od of incidence in the pipeline is reduced as the 
pipelines condition undergoes a certain chan-
ge. Note that, the catastrophe likelihood varies 
for different parts of pipelines. To examine this, 
firstly a pipeline must be divided into its consti-
tuent parts, such that each part has the same con-
dition. The steps of Risk analysis by FTA method 
have been show in Fig. 1 (Vinnem, 2013).
Figure. 1. The steps of Risk analysis using FTA method 
Slika 1. Faze analize rizika pomoću FTA metode 
METHODOLOGY
In this study, firstly expected scenarios and 
catastrophes are identified for a given gas pipe-
lines facility and then the reasons and factors 
behind these catastrophes are examined. Finally, 
the procedure used to estimate the likelihood of 
the events is investigated using FTA method. To 
elaborate, the current research study uses FTA 
method to attribute logically the underlying fac-
tors of the events to top implications and the 
identified scenarios.
Identifying credible scenarios
We used ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazar-
dous Atmospheres) software to identify the sce-
narios and examine their implications. In this 
step, gas pipelines are divided into three groups: 
a) collection pipelines, b) carrying pipelines, and 
c) distribution pipelines. Then, for each group of 
pipelines, the input information was provided for 
the software based on the characteristics of each 
group. Credible scenarios were recognized ba-
sed on the output models.
Identifying risks of incidence and                          
underlying factors
Although FTA method is itself an appropria-
te method to identify the risks (Vinnem, 2013), 
but “what-if” method is suggested for the case 
of gas pipelines. This non-systematic methodo-
logy takes less time compared to other methods 
to identify the risks and doesn’t require signifi-
cant expertise. It is a flexible method through 
which combinations of failures can be examined 
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(Dennis & Nolan, 1994). If a full-blown and well-
informed “what-if” methodology is implemented 
for gas pipelines, a complete checklist can be de-
signed. This checklist can be later used for ever 
to identify risks in various parts of gas pipelines. 
“What-if” methodology is mainly based on bra-
instorming sessions, discussion and interaction 
(Dennis & Nolan, 1994).
Incidence likelihood
As suggested, FTA method is not used in this 
research to identify the risks rather FTA algo-
rithm is used along with “what-if” methodology 
to estimate the likelihood of catastrophes. To this 
end, various mathematical formulations and pro-
bability rules are employed.
SCENARIO DISCUSSION
In order to use FTA methodology, it is needed 
to firstly identify incidences and their final impli-
cations. Expected scenarios vary for each system, 
depending on its conditions and characteristics. 
For instance, it doesn’t make sense to consider 
pool firing for a gas reservoir or a gas pipeline. 
However, it is not always so easy to identify the 
expected scenarios, because they depend on 
different situations. To this end, historical data of 
the system must also be considered.
Based on the models developed using ALO-
HA software, it is very unlikely for the incidences 
resulted from the following scenarios to occur: 
1: Gas toxicity effect (Fig. 2), 2: Flash fire (Fig. 
3). The likelihood of these scenarios can be ne-
glected. These are resulted from the nature and 
characteristics of natural gas. However, the con-
centration of H2S is high in pipelines that con-
vey sour gas. This is the case with gas collection 
pipelines in the southern part of Iran which must 
be taken into consideration as a factor that incre-
ase the toxicity of natural gas. Additionally, alt-
hough natural gas is free of toxicity property, but 
long term exposure to the material and decrease 
in oxygen concentration because of gas leakage 
may leave health problems in individuals. Gene-
rally, based on historical data obtained for pipe-
lines system, toxicity and flash fire scenarios can 
be neglected (Vianello & Maschio, 2014).
Figure 2. Output model of ALOHA for toxicity effect  
of natural gas in a 60 psi pipeline
 Slika 2. Izlazni model prema ALOHI za  
učinke toksičnosti prirodnog plina na cjevovodu 60 psi
Figure 3. Output model of ALOHA for flash                      
fire effect in 60 psi pipeline
 Slika 3. Izlazni model prema ALOHI za           
bukteći požar na cjevovodu 60 psi
Based on output models obtained by ALOHA 
software and the information gathered about re-
cent incidences, the most important expected 
scenarios in gas pipelines are as follows:
A.  Jet fire: this happens when a flammable 
chemical is rapidly passing through a hole cre-
ated on a container, leading it to be ignited just 
there. The shape of the resulted flame is simi-
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lar to welding flame. The most important dan-
ger caused by jet fire is its thermal radiation 
(ALOHA user’s manual, 2002). In the case of 
natural gas pipelines, when the rate of gas 
leakage is high and output gas is ignited for 
any reason like the spark caused by mechani-
cal strike on the pipeline, jet fire scenario is 
expected (Fig. 4).
B. Vapor cloud explosion: this scenario hap-
pens when the gas is not ignited, once it exits 
the hole and is conveyed into an inbound envi-
ronment like surrounding buildings through 
wind flow and accumulated there. In time, the 
gas concentration rises in this place reaching 
to a ignitable level (Fig. 5). At this point, an 
energy source like electrical appliances may 
create a spark leading to the explosion of the 
gas with a high intensity. The significant energy 
resulted from this explosion creates energy wa-
ves and thermal radiation and throws explosion 
materials around. This will result in damages 
to facilities and individuals. Those surrounding 
buildings that are within Lower Flammability 
Limit (LFL) may be damaged considerably as 
a result of vapor cloud explosion (Jo & Ahn, 
1994).
Note that the procedure for examining the 
underlying causes of these two scenarios is 
completely similar. However, these causes in 
the scenarios may vary to some extent for diffe-
rent incidences. For instance, consider a case 
in which the incidence is caused by sabotage 
organized operation and evil actions involving 
implanting bombs and explosives. Jet fire is 
the expected scenario for these cases. In the 
case of bed super vapor explosion, taking this 
case as the cause of catastrophe, may lead to 
wrong estimation of the likelihood of this sce-
nario. Taken this, in order to use FTA method, 
it is suggested to firstly identify scenarios for 
other systems and calculate the likelihood for 
each scenario separately. Having determined 
the likelihood of catastrophe for each scenario, 
we can use mathematics and probability rela-
tionships to calculate the overall likelihood of 
incidence.
Figure 4. Output model of ALOHA software for jet fire 
in 6 psi pipeline
Slika 4. Izlazni model prema ALOHI za mlazni požar 
na cjevovodu 6 psi  
Figure 5. Output model of ALOHA software for jet fire 
in 60 psi pipeline
Slika 5. Izlazni model prema ALOHI za mlazni požar 
na cjevovodu 60 psi
Identified risks (hazards)
As mentioned before, we used “what-if” met-
hodology to identify the risks involved in gas pi-
pelines. The procedure for identifying the risks 
in a given system using the method is as follows 
(Dennis & Nolan, 1994):
1. Define hypotheses for the set which are 
acceptable during the process.
2. Define borders and operational states for 
the set which is being studied.
3. Select and verify the range of a node. [a 
system must be split into smaller pieces]
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4. Explain the overall objectives of the desi-
gn and operational condition of the node.
5. Determine process parameters of nodes.
6. Propose a “what-if” question.
7. Identify all risk scenarios through “what-
if” question.
8. Repeat the above procedure for other 
“what-if” questions.
9. Repeat the above procedure for other no-
des.
However, in order to identify the significant 
and important identified risks, a risk analysis may 
be required. This analysis must involve an estima-
tion of likelihood and the intensity of each impli-
cation of the expected incidences for each risk.
Most important risks for natural gas pipelines 
identified using this method are as follows:
• Applying mechanical strokes and da-
mages to pipelines as a result of external 
interventions and unauthorized diggings.
• A variety of erosion that may be origina-
ted from failure in protective methods, like 
using inappropriate covers or materials for 
manufacturing pipes.
• Erosion in pipelines that usually are re-
sulted from the presence of impurities in 
natural gas. Also, external erosion may be 
caused by the flow of floodwater over the 
pipelines or earth which removes outer 
coverage of the pipe and decreases the 
thickness of the pipes.
• Land slide
• Sabotage, evil actions and terrorism
• Explosion or jet fire in another pipeline 
which is in neighborhood of the given pi-
peline
• The presence of a fault in implementing 
hydrostatic test or applying the pressures 
that are higher than maximum allowable 
pressure in the pipelines
• Explosion and overall rupture in a part of 
pipeline which might be resulted from the 
formation and the spread of a crack, volu-
me defects or unsuitable welding
• The presence of a fault in HOT TAP ope-
rations
• Fatigue which might be caused by of 
fluctuations in pipelines
• Static electricity built up in poly-ethylene 
pipelines (in distribution network)
The procedure of estimating                               
catastrophes likelihood
 Generally, influential factors in likelihood of 
catastrophes or the underlying causes of the inci-
dences are classified into five groups, as shown 
in (Figure 6). Each risk identified in this section 
belongs to one of these groups. Also, each of 
these classes or groups is influenced by special 
actions and conditions which are examined and 
weighted in FTA method.
Figure 6. Influential factors in likelihood                          
of catastrophes
Slika 6. Čimbenici koji utječu na vjerojatnost nesreće
Particular symbols and shapes are used in 
FTA methodology to represent underlying causes 
of incidences and estimate the likelihood of the 
top event, as are explained if (Table 1).
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Table 1.  Symbols and shapes used in FTA methodology
Tablica 1.  Znakovi i oblici koji se koriste u FTA metodologiji
1. Assigning weights to those sections that 
multiple input with “OR” gate is connec-
ted to one output.
2. Estimating the incidence likelihood for un-
derlying causes based on the system con-
dition and historical data.
3. Summarizing probabilities and using pro-
bability rules from top to bottom to obtain 
the likelihood of the main scenario.
In the first step, the influence of each input 
on outputs is investigated and the fault tree is 
weighted. Historical data and previous experi-
ences can be used to assign weights or this may 
be achieved using indices provided in reference 
books and handbooks. As the probability must 
be less than 1, the weighting must be performed 
in a way that the sum of the weights assigned to 
inputs will be equal to 1. The likelihood of each 
input is multiplied by to the weight assigned to 
the input. Finally, these values add up to give us 
Logic gates
“OR” gate
“OR” gate - indikates if any input incidences happen, the output incidence 
will happen as well
“AND” gate
“AND” gate - indicates that the output incidence will happen only if all the 
input incidences happen simultaneously
Input incidences 
(states)
(Initial incidence) Represents a fundamental fault in the tools which doesn´t 
need any extension and investigation
(Unexamined incidence) Represents an incidence that has not been investigate 
more due to the lack of access to information or the fact that the implications 
of the incidence are not important
Explanation about a 
give state






(Outgoing carrying) symbol indicates that the fault tree has been investigated 
more in the symbol place (incoming carrying)
Estimating the likelihood of jet fire scenario
This section employs the data obtained about 
underlying causes of incidences to study parti-
ally the procedure of investigating the underlying 
causes of catastrophes and estimating the like-
lihood of the top event. As the paper doesn’t 
afford to include all aforementioned scenarios, 
jet fire scenario is only investigated. In this sce-
nario, we examine where “external intervention” 
factor originates to find underlying causes and 
finally examine formula and logic relationships 
used in FTA method. The similar procedure can 
be used to identify underlying causes of other 
factors including erosion, design factors, land 
slide, fault in operations and inappropriate uses. 
Additionally, the similar procedure is repeated 
for the scenario of bed super vapor explosion.
The following three step process is suggested 
to calculate the likelihood of an incidence using 
FTA methodology:
25
SIGURNOST 58 (1) 19 - 30 (2016)M. EbRahEMzadIh, P.a. haEdaRI: Investigating the likelihood ... 
the likelihood of a given output incidence. This 
process is much similar to the way we calculate 
weighted average. Historical data can be consi-
dered in calculating probability of incidences. A 
sample weighting of the tree is sown in (Fig. 7).
Figure 7. A sample of weighting tree for those inputs 
that are connected to output using “OR” gate
Slika 7. Primjer težinskog stabla za ulaze povezane s 
izlazom pomoću ‘ILI’ sklopa 
This weighting process indicates that the inci-
dence of the top event is 30% dependent to inci-
dence of event 1, while its dependency to event 
2 is 70%. The sum of assigned weights is equal 
to 1. If more than 2 inputs are present, again the 
sum of weights must be equal to 1.
In the second and third steps, the likelihood 
of catastrophes is examined from bottom to top. 
Then, based on assigned weights and “intersecti-
on” and “union” rules in probability discussion, 
the likelihood of the top event is estimated.
Based on intersection rule, if multiple inputs 
are connected to output using “AND” gate, then 
the likelihood of output incidence is equal to the 
product of likelihood of inputs incidence (this 
rule holds if inputs are independent from each 
other). As the probability assigned o each input 
is less than 1, the product of the likelihood of 
inputs will be reliably less than 1. The probabi-
lity relationship for those inputs that are connec-
ted to output using an “AND” gate is as follows 
(Jo & Crowl, 2008):
 (1)
Where m is the number of independent inputs 
of “AND” gate, xi values are inputs of “AND” 
gate for i=1,2,3,..., m and P (xi) is the likelihood 
of the incidence of input xi. Finally, P(X) is the 
likelihood of output incidence of the gate.
Based on union rule, if multiple inputs are 
connected to a single output through “OR” gate, 
the likelihood of the occurrence of the output is 
equal to the sum of the likelihood of the inputs 
(note that all the inputs must be mutually exclusi-
ve. That is, their intersection must be null) (Ross, 
2014). Overall likelihood of independent inputs 
that are connected to output through “OR” gate 
is determined through the following relationship 
(Jo & Crowl, 2008):
(2)
Where k is the total number of independent 
inputs of “OR” gate, yι values are the input of 
“OR” gate for i=1,2,3,..., k  and P(yι) is the li-
kelihood of the incidence of input  yι. Finally, 
P(Y) is the likelihood of the occurance of the gate 
output? 
In this formula, the inputs are considered to 
be independent. Not any two inputs can be inde-
pendent and mutually exclusive simultaneously. 
In real situation, especially when there are many 
inputs, it may not be clear whether inputs are 
independent or mutually exclusive. This formula 
holds true if all the inputs belong to a universal 
set and the relationship between these inputs is 
completely clear. Using abstract mathematical 
relationships creates ambiguity and wastes the 
time. This formula is not used in our proposed 
methodology, rather the likelihood of each in-
put is multiplied by its weight and then the sum 
of these weighted products is determined as the 
output likelihood. So, this weighting procedure is 
performed based on historical data of the system 
to limit the influence of each input in output in-
cidence to a maximum value (i.e. the assigned 
weight). This method can be used in all cases.
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In weighting process and using “OR” gate, if 
the value of and input is known as percentage, 
this value is divided by 100 and multiplied by 
the assigned weight to obtain a desirable value. 
This value represents how this input affects out-
put. For instance, if the likelihood of the inci-
dence of an input is equal to 90 percent and its 
assigned weight is equal to 0.2, the effect of this 
input on output is calculated using the following 
relationship:
(3)
The same procedure is repeated for other in-
puts, adding these numbers to obtain the likeli-
hood of output incidence. All the calculated pro-
babilities will be positive and less than 1.
The given pipeline can be split into a set of 
sections in order to determine the risk involved 
in each section separately. As the length of each 
section is known, we need only to consider a sui-
table temporal base to estimate the probability of 
an incidence. For instance, suppose that the len-
gth of a section of a given pipeline is equal to 1 
kilometer and historical data indicate that 5 days 
out of 365 days of a year, a land slide is likely in 
this section of the pipeline. In this case, the like-
lihood of land slide in this section is about 1.37 
percent or 0.0137. Other calculations follow the 
same procedure. To interpret the calculated like-
lihoods, both one kilometer base and 365 days 
of the year must be taken into consideration. For 
instance, if the calculation process in the fault 
tree leads to the value of 0.06 for the likeliho-
od of the top event, it means that catastrophe is 
expected to happen in about 22 days of a year in 
the given one kilometer section of the pipeline.
We have supposed in this three step process 
that the inputs connected to output using “AND” 
gate are independent from each other. To have a 
more precise estimation of the main scenario, it 
is advisable to design the fault tree in a way that 
this assumption holds.
The fault tree for jet fire scenario is depicted 
in Fig. 8. The calculations are started from the 
lowest part of the tree. As already mentioned, 
the pipeline must be split into a set of sections 
to examine the likelihood of catastrophe and the 
risk involved in gas pipelines (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
If we consider a particular part of the pipeline, 
the following formulation can be proposed for 
“external interventions”.
Note that in these formulations, P (a) repre-
sents the likelihood of event a. Referring to Fig. 8 
and the weights assigned in the fault tree deno-
ted with W symbol, the following formulations 
are driven:
If:
P(F1) =0.2,P(F2) =0.6,P(F3) =0.4
Then:
P(E3) = W17 x P(F1)+W18 x P(F2) x W19 x 
P(F3)
 P(E3) = 0.3 x 0.2 + 0.4 x 0.6 + 0.3 x 0.4 = 
0.42
Similarly, if:
P(E1) = 0.01, P(E2) = 0.1, P(E4) = 0.1, P(E5) = 
0.9, P(E6) = 0.4, P(E7) = 0.02, P(E8) = 0.7 
Then:
P(C3) = P(E1) x W9 + P(E2) x W10 + P(E3) x 
W11 + P(E4) x W12 + P(E5) x W(13) + E6 x 
W14 + P(E4) + P(E7) x W15 + P(E8) x W16
 P(C3) = 0.01 x 0.1+0.1 x 0.2 + 0.42 x 0.1 + 0.1 
x 0.1 + 0.9 x 0.1 + 0.4 x 0.1 + 0.02 x 0.05 + 0.7 
x 0.25 ≅ 0.38
Additionally, we suppose that the likelihood 
of spark in leakage area is 50 percent for inad-
vertent interventions. Then, P(C4)=0.5 , because 
C3 and C4 are connected to B2 using “AND” 
gate. Now, we use mathematical sets intersec-
tion rule:
P(B2) = P(C3) x P(C4) = 0.38 x 0.5 = 0.19
We proceed to other parts of the tree:
If:
P(D1) = 0.5, P(D2) = 0.8, P(D3) = 0.1
Then:
P(C1) = P(D1) x P(D2) x P(D3) = 0.04
Input influence =             x 0.2 = 0.1890
100
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In deliberate sabotage, the likelihood of 
spark is approximately 100 percent. So, P(C2) 
can be assumed to be equal to 1. Then,
P(B1) = P(C1) x P(C2) = 0.04 x 1.00 = 0.04
Having calculated these values, the likeliho-
od of catastrophe resulted from external inter-
ventions (L) is obtained:
P(L) = P(B1) x W7 + P(B2) x W8 = 0.04 x 0.5 
+ 0.19 x 0.5 ≅ 0.12
Repeating the same procedure for other fac-
tors, we can easily obtain erosion likelihood 
(M), land slide likelihood (N), the likelihood of 
fault in design factors (O), and the likelihood 
of inappropriate use and operation (P). Finally, 
the likelihood of jet fire scenario (X1) for a gi-
ven section is estimated using the following re-
lationship:
P(X1) = P(L) x W4 + P(M) x W5 + P(N) x W6 
+ P(O) x W3 + P(P) x W2
Figure 8. Fault tree for Jet fire scenario, with identification of underlying causes of “external interventions”
Slika 8. Stablo kvarova za scenarij mlaznog požara, s utvrđenim uzrocima “vanjskih intervencija”
B 1 Deliberate interventions E 2 Inobservance to principles of pipelines burial like shallow burial
B 2 Inadvertent interventions E 3 Burial of pipelines in areas with high activity load
C 1 Sabotage, evil activities and terrorism E 4 Infrequency of patrols
C 2 Likelihood of spark in leakage area E 5 Insufficiency of educational plans for public
C 3 Inadvertent interventions leading to gas leakage E 6 Fault in locating of buried pipeline
C 4 Likelihood of spark in leakage area E 7 Unspecified the place of pipeline
D 1 Infrequency of patrols E 8 Unauthorized diggings
D 2 Inefficiency of protection systems F 1 Burial of pipelines in areas which are under construction
D 3
Likelihood of political unrest and strategic position 
of given pipeline
F 2 Burial of pipelines near other buried pipelines and facilities
E 1 Inefficient protection of surface facilities F 3 Burial of pipelines in highly populated areas with high traffic level
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CONCLUSION AND RESULT
This paper adopts FTA methodology to study 
the process of catastrophes likelihood estimation 
in natural gas pipelines. Also, a novel method 
is provided here which is based on assigning 
weights to fault tree and “What-if” scenario is 
used to identify the hazards involved in carrying 
natural gas from its main source. Based on the 
results obtained in the study, we propose to con-
trol the likelihood of catastrophes occurrence 
in natural gas pipelines using a technical and 
systematic approach in which the underlying 
causes of these catastrophes are identified and 
controlled.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a very powerful 
technique and widely used for evaluating the 
safety and reliability of complex system and oil-
gas pipeline (Markowski, 2012). According to 
the study conducted by DONG Yu-hua, et al, 
A 52 minimal cut sets have been achieved with 
qualitative analysis, while the failure probability 
of top event and the criticality analysis of basic 
events could be calculated with quantitative 
analysis, based on this study Fault tree analysis 
(FTA) is a very powerful technique and widely 
used for evaluating the safety and reliability of 
complex system. The failure of oil and gas pipe-
line was analyzed by fault tree analysis in this 
paper (Yu-hua, 2002).
In the modern petroleum industry, pipeline 
is one of the safest and the most economical 
methods to transport lager quantities of oil and 
natural gas, On the basis of investigating and stu-
dying, taking “gas pipeline be damaged by third-
party interference” as top event and considering 
31 basic events, a relatively integrated fault tree 
model is established. Then the results of qualita-
tive analysis on this fault tree are discussed (Li-
ang et al., 2011). According to the study conduc-
ted by ZHENG Xian-bin and et al., showed that 
The combination method of fault tree analysis 
and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method 
was proposed to make research of oil and gas 
pipeline failure and result indicates that the FTA 
method makes full use of their advantages and 
controls their disadvantages, and is feasible to 
evaluate the oil and Gas pipeline failure based 
on this study The result indicates that the method 
makes full use of their advantages and controls 
their disadvantages, and is feasible to evaluate 
the oil and Gas pipeline failure (Zheng & Guo-
ming, 2005). 
Today, it is no longer possible to predict fu-
ture conditions of real world using simple and 
abstract mathematical relations. It seemed that 
probability distribution cannot account for un-
derlying causes of human-induced errors, safety 
culture and similar subjects. Using mathemati-
cal relationships may take a lot of time and lead 
us astray, if historical data and the information 
about the background of a system obtained thro-
ugh observations and measurement are not used. 
In modern world, the emergence of fuzzy logic 
on one hand and the fact that many researchers 
tend to use knowledge based calculations on 
another hand indicate the inefficiency of some 
mathematical relationships and the rules and 
techniques of probability science in explaining 
the complex conditions of real word. This rese-
arch paper places emphasis on historical data in 
examining the probability of catastrophes likeli-
hood in natural gas pipelines. To meet this requ-
irement, historical data were used in software, 
mathematical and logical calculations to identify 
credible scenarios, risks and fault tree analysis. 
Based on the results obtained through this re-
search, several steps can be taken to provide a 
framework based on experiments and mathema-
tical to examine and estimate the likelihood of 
catastrophes incidence in natural gas pipelines. 
These steps include using catastrophe modeling 
software with historical data, identification of ri-
sks using “what-if” methodology, establishment 
of fault tree and assigning weights to it based 
on historical data and finally implementing FTA 
methodology and analyzing it using formulations 
provided in this research.
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ISPITIVANJE VJEROJATNOSTI NESREĆA NA CJEVOVODIMA ZA PRIRODNI PLIN 
METODOM INTEGRACIJE ANALIZE STABLA KVAROVA I WHAT-IF SCENARIJA 
SAŽETAK: Prirodni plin danas se smatra najvećim izvorom energije potrebne stambenim po-
dručjima i industriji. Pogled na tehnologije kojima se Iran koristi otkriva da su plinovodi najbolji 
i najsigurniji način za distribuciju prirodnog plina u zemlji. Ovaj izvor energije, koji se ponekad 
naziva čistim gorivom, ima stratešku ulogu u opskrbi potrebne energije. S druge strane, opskrba 
gorivom mora biti stalna, ali i sigurna. Stoga se zaključuje da su potrebne odgovarajuće mjere 
za upravljanje rizicima od curenja, požara i eksplozija na ovakvim postrojenjima. Za postizanje 
toga cilja najpotrebnije je ustanoviti uzroke nesreća i ispitati pouzdanost. Nadalje, neizbježno 
se mora procijeniti vjerojatnost događanja nesreće na cjevovodima. Jedan od ključnih koraka u 
procesu vrednovanja rizika jest procjena vjerojatnosti mogućih nesreća. Članak se koristi FTA 
(fault tree analysis) metodologijom za proučavanje načina procjene vjerojatnosti nesreća na 
cjevovodima za prirodni plin. Nadalje, ponuđena je i nova metoda temeljena na pridruživanju 
težina stablu kvarova, a ‘what-if’ (što-ako) scenarij služi za utvrđivanje opasnosti pri transportu 
prirodnog plina od njegova glavnog izvora. Na osnovi rezultata studije predlaže se da se vje-
rojatnost događanja nesreća na cjevovodima za prirodni plin kontrolira tehničkim i sustavnim 
pristupom kojim se utvrđuju i kontroliraju uzroci tih nesreća.   
Ključne riječi: vjerojatnost nesreće, pouzdanost, uzroci nesreća, ALOHA software, scenarij 
mlaznog požara 
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